Observation Questions

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2026 Primary Election Questions and Answers

For the 2026 Primary Election, detailed or at-length observation questions are required to be submitted using the official question form. Responses will be provided as resources and operational timelines allow, usually within 72 hours. Acceptance and processing of submitted questions are subject to review by the Registrar of Voters’ Office.

Questions and answers submitted during the 2026 Primary Election.
Submitter & Date	Question	Answer
Valerie W. 5/15/2026	Describe in detail the chain of custody process that will be used to transport the ballots printed at the ICX stations then delivered to the ROV processing room? Which vote center staff will remove the ballots and complete the chain of custody documents? What is the schedule for removing the ICP tank's ballots be transferred to boxes? What documentation will be completed when the ICP ballots are removed from the tank, and who will be signing the documentation? How will the ICP ballots be secured before leaving the vote center? Who will transport the ICP ballots to the ROV processing room? Where will the ICP ballots be stored securely? Would you please describe which type of ballots will go where on the cage shelving? It's important to know which area will hold the various types of ballots meaning already scanned, waiting to be scanned, ballots needing duplication, undeliverables, etc. The shelving areas are obviously not visible from the fishtank. The labeling on the front of the shelving is not visible from the wall cameras. The cage is essentially unobservable. It is not meaningful to simply see a body in the cage but have no observation regarding which ballots are being accessed. Why are the already scanned ballots not sealed after the batches have been scanned?	At the end of each night, Vote Center Manager/Assistant Managers will unloads the vote center scanner boxes of ballots and fill out the chain of custody document. Ballots are secured in a sealed box, and will be transported back by Ballot Runners/Managers/Assistant Managers to the Central Counting Place. Vote Center paper ballots are stored in on the north side of the cage (against the fence). On the south side, ballots are stored starting from the eastern section extending towards the western section depending on the step of the process they are in. The north center of the cage shelves are dedicated to envelopes from extracted verified ballots or undeliverable envelopes. The south center of the cage shelves is dedicated to scanned mail ballots. The west side wall of the cage is dedicated to provisional ballots, while the east side wall of the cage is dedicated to discrepant ballots. Central Counting Place ballots are not sealed because of the access needed for staff's periodic audits.
Brianna F. 5/15/2026	Between 4:15p - 4:45p in tabulation room there were 2-3 people working with a laptop at workstation #3. What procedure were they completing? What were the devices used (ibutton) and for what purpose? The laptop - does it move in and out of the tabulation room? Does that laptop leave processing floor? Does that laptop leave county building and if so where does it travel to?	ROV Staff entered the tabulation room to setup the election file from the Election Management System EMS onto the scanners within the central counting place. The ibuttons are used to access the EMS. ROV staff only used the laptop to view instructions on this process. Please note the laptop is not affiliated with the EMS nor was/is connected to the EMS, as it is a county laptop assigned to that staff member.
Roblyn W. 5/18/2026	What do the green and orange badges indicate?	The badges worn by election worker staff in the Central Counting Place indicate that person’s current registered political party. REP - Pink, DEM - Light Blue, NP - Yellow, Green - All Others.
Roblyn W. 5/18/2026	Once the ballots that have returned undeliverable or return to sender labels are noted in the signature verification/bluecrest machines, how are the ballots stored and who removes them from the rolls?	Undeliverable ballots are labeled as such and stored in the ballot cage on shelves that specify they are undeliverable. After the election, the undeliverable ballots are used as reason to initiate the process to inactive the voter pursuant to NRS 293.530.
Brianna F. 5/18/2026	The laptop-does it move in and out of the Tabulation Room? Does that laptop leave the processing floor? Does that laptop leave county building and if so where does it travel to? Additional questions relating to your response and my observations on 5/15/2026: This laptop, you are describing, does it have wi-fi capability or has the ability to communicate without cable connections? Is this laptop assigned specifically to the gentleman who was working on it on Friday, 5/15/2026?	As it is a county laptop assigned to that staff member, it does indeed move in and out of the tabulation room, leave the processing floor, and may travel with the staff member. Yes, it is Wi-Fi capable and connected to the employee internet and yes, it is specifically assigned to that staff member.
Pam S. 5/18/2026	Exactly how is manual signature verification completed? Should we see 2 people at one computer screen together or do they do it seperately. If we can't see 2 people doing it than there is no way to confirm that 2 people looked at it + that it was a bipartisan process.	Once a ballot arrives to manual signature verification, a bi-partisan team reviews the digital capture of the signature on the ballot and compares it to any signature available within the voter's registration. If the bi-partisan team does not agree, a permanent ROV staff member assists in breaking the tie. If it matches, it is accepted and processed. If it does not match, it is challenged and requires a cure.
Roblyn W. 5/20/2026	How does the bluecrest sorter connect with the voter registration system?	The Bluecrest sorter is connected via wire to the "overseer" station on the opposite end of the central counting place. There, staff export data from the sorter onto the workstation - the data will then be uploaded via an FTP to the VREMS system. Data from the VREMS system is pulled via the FTP and is provided back to the sorter. This is done throughout the day as mail ballot envelopes are run through the sorter.
Brianna F. 5/21/26	Yesterday, 5/20/26 approximately 10am, a small group went into the tabulation room. What tasks were they performing? Who were they? Is the bluecrest sorter verifying signatures and if so at what percentage accuracy? Are any ballots being sorted by hand? Where online are observer questions posted?	ROV Staff entered the tabulaton room to prepare the EMS and conduct the portion of Pre-Logic and Accuracy testing that takes place within the central counting place. Our Bluecrest sorter has Automatic Signature Verification enabled - a software that compares the signature to signatures on the voter's file and assigns it a "confidence score". The ROV has set the sorter to automatically signature verify any signatures that meet or are above a 73 confidence score. Ballot envelopes that have trouble being sorted, mostly due to being bent/damaged/soiled, are hand-checked in. Observer question submissions are posted online at washoecounty.gov/voters under the Observation section.
Robyln W. 5/23/2026	Area under "counting board" sign, one worker at the table 4:17pm - I watched a woman doing what looks like extraction. She is removing ballots from one envelope and placing into a second envelope. The first goes into a bin, then into a pile. Is she doing hand extraction? Why taking from one envelope and then placing in a second? Are these mail in ballots? What happens to these ballots next? Wondering also if she is staff and allowed what I think is an iPhone.	This was a staff member processing EASE/UOCAVA duplicated materials. When something has to be duplicated, the original document must be labeled, sealed, and stored. These original materials are no longer apart of the process, while the duplicated ballot is prepared for scanning. In your specific scenario, a staff member removed a UOCAVA paper printed ballot from its original envelope, and stored it in a duplicated ballot envelope. Staff are allowed to have their phones on their persons, though we recommend them to leave their personal phones elsewhere before entering the Central Counting Place. Personal phones are not allowed to be used, while County assigned phones are allowed to be used.
Valerie W. 5/24/2026	Is there anything that can be done to address the air quality and temperature in the Elections Department Observation Room? This containment room is neither safe nor comfortable for observers and hasn't been since its construction. There is no fresh air circulation in the room. Air from outside the room only enters when the single entry door briefly opens to let someone enter or exit. Per the Registrar’s rules, the door cannot be left open or even cracked, so the room's air remains completely sealed. The HVAC ceiling register doesn't appear to be functional. In the many hours I've observed while restricted to the room without windows, I've never felt air moving out of the register. I attempted to catch your eye last night when you were in the processing room, so you could verify that the temperature inside the observation room was too warm. You didn't respond. Earlier, I had also asked "Zach" to ask you to come to the observation room. You didn't over the entire evening. I’m attaching a photo I took at about 8:15 p.m. on May 23, 2026, showing the thermometer reading in the room - 78-80 degrees F. I brought the thermometer with me to specifically document the air and temperature conditions since the air quality and temperature in the Observation Room have been uncomfortable for far too long over several elections. This is not a single event. The temperature held steady at that high level for hours. I was present in the room from roughly 5:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., and another observer stayed even longer—from about 2:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. Only the two of us were in the room during that time, but additional observers' bodies raise the temperature even more. None of the machinery in the processing room were used until approximately 8:30 PM, so equipment heat did not cause the issue. Recommended workplace temperatures generally fall between 68°F and 76°F if supplied with fresh air. Good indoor air quality also requires comfortable humidity levels and a steady supply of fresh outdoor air. The Observation Room does not have consistent fresh air available. Also, the HVAC ceiling register never has shown any detectable air movement, fresh-air supply, or temperature regulation during any of my visits to observe ballot processing during any election. I've kept fruitlessly hoping that the observation room's air and temperature issues would be addressed. I'm finally requesting action. Expecting observers to remain in that environment for any period of time is unreasonable and inconsiderate. It raises the question: Is Registrar Andrew Macdonald unintentionally (or intentionally) discouraging public oversight of ballot processing or attempting to limit transparency? Your prompt attention to this matter and any steps taken to improve ventilation and temperature control in the room will be appreciated. Please let me know if you need additional information or photos.	The Central Counting Place experiences increases in temperature due to machinery operated and amount of staff present within the room. The ballot processing floor and the observation booth are subject to the same temperature conditions, and the HVAC is functioning in both rooms. We are aware of the increases in temperature over the weekend due to the volume of work being done, and will continue to do our best to accommodate both staff and observers. While I (the Public Information Officer) do my best to be available to discuss with observers, other duties require my focus during the election and there should be no expectation that I am able to be summoned to the observation area at any moment's notice. As always, myself and Registrar McDonald encourage the public to observe the process.
Valerie W. 5/25/2026	Please provide the following information regarding mechanical devices to be tested for this 2026 Primary Election (NRS293B.150, NRS293B.155, NRS293B.165, NRS293B.170): 1) Names and party affiliation of the accuracy certification board (ACB). 2) Name of the individual who is not an employee of the county or city. 3) Were all members of the ACB present to observe all testing? 4) Please provide the date and time when the testing began. 5) Which employee(s) under the supervision of Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald conducted the testing? 6) Please provide the date and time when testing concluded. 7) Will all scanners presently located in the Ballot Processing Room be used in this 2026 Primary? 8) Have all scanners to be used in the 2026 Primary been tested? 9) Did all devices successfully pass the testing? If not, how many did not pass? Please identify the specific device(s) that did not pass. 10) Did the ACB members sign any documentation regarding the testing completion and accuracy? If so, please provide a copy of the document. Please indicate the date and time the documents were signed by the ACB member. If voters are to believe that the ACB members are attesting to the accuracy of the testing, citizens deserve to know who is attesting to those facts. Date and time of signing should be documented to comply with NRS regarding the time constraints.	Pre-Logic and Accuracy testing began on May 11th at 8am and continued through May 21st until end of day, conducted by Registrar of Voters staff and temporary workers, and Washoe County staff. The certification by our duly appointed Washoe County Elections Accuracy Certification Board took place on May 21st. The 3 certification board members observed the testing operations in the warehouse on May 15th and then observered testing at the Central Counting Place on May 21st. The 3 members of the certification board are Molly Rosen (DEM - City of Reno), Michelle Harper (REP - City of Sparks), and Heidi Howe (NP - Washoe County). As required by NRS 293B.150, all scanners have been tested - and all systems have passed the test.
Roblyn W. 5/25/2026	I see workers at the counting tables bundle 10 envelopes together then use a large black zip tie on them and add a lime green tag to the bundle. Please help me understand what envelopes these are - inner or outer, why are they ziptied, and what happens to them next.	The "counting board" is a step within the Life of a Ballot where staff takes account of the ballots and envelopes that were processed through extraction. The materials extracted are evaluated, and a count of ballots ready to pass onto scanning takes place. If the ballot is damaged, or has an identifying mark, it is separated out to the next step required. The envelopes are zip tied, as a form of seal, and stored, while the ballots are batched and prepared to scan.
Brianna F. 5/27/26	Today, between 11am-12pm. I saw a staff member on the mail in ballot processing floor, carry a large round key chain with numerous small black rectangular devices that resembled external flash drives. (maybe 5 or 6). This keychain was passed from one staff member to another. What are these devices and what are they used for? Where are they securely stored? Do they travel in and out of the processing floor and If so where? and where are they used outside? Are they used in the ems/tabulation room and for what purpose? Are these devices used to access the election management system. Under what supervision are they used?	Access to the voter registration system (otherwise known as VREMS or TotalVote), requires the use of multi factor authentification (MFA). The keychain you saw holds hardware security keys used to log in to the various workstations in the Central Counting Place that access the voter registration system. They are not storage devices, and are not used to access anything within the Election Management System. This keychain is secured within the Central Counting Place. The keychain is used under ROV staff supervision.
Brianna F. 5/27/26	Did all scanners pass the pre lat test? What day did the pre lat testing begin and what day was it completed? Can you please provide dates and times?	Pre-Logic and Accuracy testing began on May 11th at 8am and continued through May 21st until end of day, conducted by Registrar of Voters staff and temporary workers, and Washoe County staff. The certification by our duly appointed Washoe County Elections Accuracy Certification Board took place on May 21st. The 3 certification board members observed the testing operations in the warehouse on May 15th and then observered testing at the Central Counting Place on May 21st. The 3 members of the certification board are Molly Rosen (DEM - City of Reno), Michelle Harper (REP - City of Sparks), and Heidi Howe (NP - Washoe County). As required by NRS 293B.150, all scanners have been tested - and all systems have passed the test.
Roblyn W. 5/27/2026	Why did two black trays get delivered into the processing room through the staff door to the lobby? Where did they come from? What ballots were they? Where will they processed next?	The Registrar's office has a mail ballot drop box in the lobby that is emptied every night and its contents are brought to the Central Counting Place through the office door. These ballots require chain of custody procedures as any other ballot delivery method, and are not treated any differently than other deliveries from other dropboxes or the USPS. The other type of ballots that may flow through the door are "counter ballots", which are simply mail ballots printed in-house at the request of a voter. They sit at the front office to be delivered to the individual, but if they are not picked up by closing those counter ballots must be brought back to be stored within the Central Counting Place until the following day.
Brianna F. 5/27/26	1. There seems to be a large number of undeliverable ballots at manual signature verification. I assume these are undeliverable because of the yellow postal sticker on the envelopes. Why would so many come back undeliverable? How many undeliverables have been received as to late? 2. Are members of the media allowed to unpack equipment bags at the ballot sorting table? It looked like today they were setting up next to a black tray. Did that contain ballots? Is media allowed to walk processing floor with large duffle/equipment bags? 3. Is the Bluecrest sorter machine verifying signatures today? If so, what % accuracy is this set to? 4. This morning, the security guard noticed the backdoor to garage was not shut and locked (around 9am). Could you please add a live stream view of the backdoor and please leave lights on 24/7? There were no security guards present in processing room during ballot delivery from post office this morning. 5. The staff member who performed daily maintenance this morning wears a small black rectangular device on his hip. What is this? 6. Could you please turn on the tabulation room lights? 7. I saw someone on processing floor with what looked to be 2 phones in their back pockets. Are personal cell phones allowed on processing floor? Do the county issued phones travel out of the building and home with staff?	After the election, the Registrar's office will do an analysis of the factors behind undeliverable ballots received. The current number of undeliverables can be viewed on the NVSOS's dashboard at NVSOS.gov/vivid. Members of the media are given access to the Central Counting Place under close supervision of the ROV's Public Information Officer or other executive staff. Under this close supervision and permission, they are allowed to conduct their business, including utilizing bags to carry equipment and setting equipment down to setup. The Bluecrest sorter has had the Automatic Signature Verification (ASV) software enabled since the start of the election, and the acceptance score threshold, which is not a %, is set at 73. The garage doors within the Central Counting Place are locked 24/7, and the doors you are mentioning are not within the Central Counting Place. Our livestream infrastructure is at capacity, and we are unable to add an additional camera for the 2026 Primary Election. The lights in the Central Counting Place are turned off when no operations are occurring, and some lights are left on to allow for some visibility on the livestream. The device mentioned on an employee's hip is a phone. County work phone usage is allowed in the Central Counting Place, but staff are not to use their personal phones despite still having them in pockets. It is likely that some county staff utilize their county assigned work phones outside of the building.
Julie B. 5/30/2026	I was wondering what the 2 people were doing in the EMS room between 10am-11:00am?	ROV staff entered the EMS room to access our Secure File Transfer System with the NVSOS’s office to receive our bi-monthly Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) reports. Please note the secure file transfer system, otherwise known as the IPSwitch, is a separate system from the voting system and is not interconnected.
Valerie W. 5/30/2026	Given that the public and ballot processing observers have been told by Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald and Media Specialist George Guthrie that Washoe County’s Election Department staff wear colored badges indicating party affiliation on the NV Voter Registration rolls: Blue=Democrat, Green=Minor parties, Red=Republican, Yellow=Nonpartisan. #1: Why should observers or any member of the public trust or believe that the badge color a worker wears when working in the ballot processing room (BPR) is accurate or true? #2: Do workers sign an affidavit regarding the truth of the badge color they wear? #3: Do supervisors attest to the truthfulness of a worker’s badge color? #4: How can observers or the public know with certainty that workers aren’t simply wearing a badge color for the convenience of supervisors in the BPR who need to give the appearance of bipartisan representation? Voter registrations can be legally changed daily. #5: Is the public being asked to simply “trust the department’s operation” regarding bipartisan representation in the processing of ballots when there is no possibility of verification and no penalties for deceitful workers and/or supervisors? #6: Why is it that since the beginning of public observation during this election that, after approximately 14 days of observation, and approximately 100-125 workers doing work in the BPR throughout these days, less than ~20 Republican election workers total have been observed working in the BPR. Public observers have been watching workers in the BPR for the large majority of processing hours since May 15 either in person or online (YouTube) and have gathered these approximations. *See #1 above regarding no possible verification of the truthfulness of the badge color being worn. Party affiliation is critically important per statute and common sense. “Bipartisan” pairs of Democrat and Nonpartisan workers disenfranchise Republican constituents when ballot duplication, adjudication, signature verification, and more are being done. See #1 above; #7: I’ve previously asked you why Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald has not done more to bring a better balanced representation of the 3 major political parties into the Elections Department BPR. You told me, “Republican county employees willing to do election work (for personal paid time off) are hard to find.” Researching this issue more, I’ve learned via confidential conversations with past/present employees that Republican or conservative employees hide their political party affiliation to avoid harassment and discrimination in the largely Democrat county and city workplace. Your comment and the confidential speakers’ comments align. The public and voters expecting a fair and honest election lose in this situation as a fair and honest election is likely not being conducted given the imbalance of party representation. I’m asking Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald to address this discriminatory and possibly illegal situation that plainly circumvents the intent of legislation regarding bipartisan representation.	All Central Counting Place operations are conducted in a nonpartisan manner. The Registrar's office ensures there are available bi-partisan teams to conduct bi-partisan mandated processing within the "Life of a Ballot". Outside of this, we strive to include as much party representation as possible with the staffing resources available. As a courtesy to observers, staff badges are issued accordingly based on the registered party on their voter registration. Workers do not sign an affidavit attesting their affiliation, as this is information directly from their voter registration.
Sean S. 5/30/2026	What is a "Tabulated Ballot" contained in the white boxes from the polling locations? Where are they counted?	Ballots cast by voters in-person at vote centers by utilizing the ballot marking devices are collected every night and sealed into the white ballot boxes. These ballots are now a paper audit trail of votes and are stored in the Central Counting Place. When cast at a vote center, the vote is digitized and transported back in SD cards. These digitized votes are counted on election night
Sean S. 5/30/2026	What is the USB device plugged into the "scanning" main computer screen?	The blue USB devices you see plugged into the scanning main computer are a physical access key port (iButton). These are utilized for administrative access by staff.
Sean S. 5/30/2026	What was Addi doing on her computer from 8;30pm to 8:54pm with no staff present? That couldn't be done on another computer?	Deputy Registrar Addie was conducting end of night data uploads on the workstations utilized for this. Both the Registrar of Voters and the Public Information Officer were present in the room for this.
Roblyn W. 5/31/2026	Two general county staff are seated at the duplication station where ballots are looked at and the staff can duplicate ballots, and fill them out by deciding what "The intension of voter is". They are opening envelopes that are labeling that says "Cancelled Ballots". Why are "Cancelled Ballots" at a station where workers can generate ballots marked by them to prep them to be scanned.	County staff were sitting at the duplication station processing ballots that require duplication. The "cancelled ballot" envelopes described are actually "duplicated ballot" envelopes. The original material of a duplicated ballot must be processed and sealed into a "duplicated ballot" envelope to be stored after this step of the process is completed.
Penny B. 5/31/2026	Why is the date and time when mail in ballot tracker update not posted? Why is the date and name of the responder to the observer questions asked, not posted as is required by Questioner when posted online?	The Turnout Tracker Dashboard is operated by the Nevada Secretary of State's office - and has a field at the top indicating when the data was last updated. The NVSOS releases files of this data that are downloadable and timestamped. All observer questions are responded to by the Registrar of Voter's Public Information Officer, George Guthrie. In addition to online posting, question answers are provided via email to the submitter which includes a timestamp.
Valerie W. 5/31/2026	As you are aware, I have observed many, many hours in the Observation Room this election. I’ve noticed a pattern with two workers who have regularly been working in the ballot processing room and especially at the signature verification work stations. A worker with long red hair and light pink eyeglasses (name unknown) pairs herself with the same individual over and over again and has been doing so for many days when they’ve both been working. The other worker is “Cate” or “Cait.” They frequently sit at the signature verification workstation farthest away from the observation container regardless of there being 7 vacant signature verification workstations. Election Department’s authentic desire to provide meaningful observation would accommodate observers by placing signature verifying workers at work stations closest to the observation container. An authentic desire for instilling confidence in the ballot processing room’s operations would also entail monitoring that the same individuals are not repeatedly verifying signatures together. Tracking worker pairs at the signature verification station would also be helpful in giving observers confidence that “agreements” or collaboration between workers have not been made. If observers had the opportunity to verify workers’ actual party affiliation, and if there were enforced penalties for workers’ false representation via badge color re party affiliation, this doubt as to the accuracy of signature verification work by workers wouldn’t exist. Just a few minutes ago, both workers have been looking over their shoulders at me to see if I were watching them. This also creates doubt as to the accuracy of their work at the signature verification work stations today and previously. I’m requesting that pairs of workers not be allowed to repeatedly work together at the signature verification work stations to avoid the appearance of impropriety. I’m requesting that signature verification workers be located at work stations closest to the observation container rather than farthest away from observers in order to provide meaningful observation. Will Registrar of Voters Andrew Macdonald support meaningful verification and instill confidence in the accuracy of manual signature verification for observers concerned about the signature verification work being done at these work stations? Both are very reasonable requests.	The Registrar of Voters Office verifies employee voter registration records before assigning badges color-coded to their party, and there is no misrepresentation of an employee’s party affiliation. Employees working within the Central Counting Place are trained to conduct signature verification in accordance with Nevada law and perform signature verification in compliance with those requirements. While working, employees may look around the room, and doing so does not affect the accuracy or validity of the work being performed. All signature verification stations are available for use by staff, as each station is meaningfully observable from the observation booth.
Roblyn W. 6/1/2026	Again, a person is working at the table in the cage under the camera and out of "meaningful observation". This has been a repeated complaint. There are 4 vacant seats she can be using, on camera. You say have repeatedly spoken to the staff, George Gutherie. Are there ever any consequences when the supervisors and rules are ignored?	The batching table within the ballot cage is viewable from the observation booth directly and from the livestream camera, with differing angles. There is no rule that staff may not use this table depending on vacant seats, but processing room staff are always encouraged to make their actions as clear as possible to observers.
Roblyn W. 6/1/2026	We witnessed a worker remove her red "republican" badge in the processing room and hand it to Andrew, who put it on, who has been sitting + chatting with Addie + George, who then gave it to George. We were told that badges would not be used by others or exchanged. Because, after checking the county workers voter registration, they are assigned a badge based on their party to participate in teams where tasks need a team of two different parties. This is important, to be sure cheating cannot occur. George said the badges have names and are kept in the outer offices and reused by those workers. Why, then, did we just see a worker take off her badge and hand it over? At a time that we have been questioning why there are rarely republican county employees working, so they were never part of teams in sensitive areas, it was nice to see four in the room today so imagine my surprise when we saw the badge exchange before she left. was she wearing Georgeʼs badge instead of being issued her own? Are badges issued to workers without vetting, to better represent parties now?	The Registrar's office ensures there are available bi-partisan teams to conduct bi-partisan mandated processing within the" Life of a Ballot". Outside of this, we strive to include as much party representation as possible with the staffing resources available. The worker you are describing handed her assigned badge over to supervisors to be securely stored along with their hardware security key used to access the voter registration system, as it was the end of their shift. As a courtesy to observers, badges issued indicate the staffer’s party, and this is verified by checking it against their voter registration.
Roblyn W. 6/2/2026	In a discussion with George Gutherie on 5/31/26, about the continual belief by observers there is a lack of required "meaningful observation" in the ballot processing room, he told us that representatives from Washoe GOP, Nevada GOP, and the Trump team, declared there was "meaningful observation" being provided by the ROV. Who were those people and what day did they tour and view the ballot process in the ballot processing room?	Washoe County’s Central Counting Place offers the opportunity to visit in person and meaningfully observe ballot processing operations. The Registrar of Voters Office also provides a courtesy livestream as an additional transparency measure. Between elections during the 2024 election cycle, the Registrar of Voters Office conducted observation tours for representatives of various stakeholder organizations to gather feedback on the layout and configuration of the facility to help maximize meaningful observation within the constraints of the space. Feedback received during these tours was considered, and adjustments were made where appropriate. Both before and after these adjustments, these stakeholders concurred with our assessment that the Central Counting Place provides meaningful observation of ballot processing operations. The overall layout of the Central Counting Place has remained substantially unchanged since the 2024 election cycle. Participating organizations included the NVGOP, NVDEMS, Washoe County Republican Party, and WashoeDems. As these tours were over 2 years ago, we do not have any details on the dates of names of the specific representatives from these organizations.
Roblyn W. 6/2/2026	George Gutherie explained a few days ago how the different machines were closed wifi no outside access. At 4pm 15:45ish on live stream we witness county employee - male, black shirt, beard, glasses, larger, have an issue signing in at the end signature verification (manual) station. He couldnʼt sign in w/ password. He literally went to a GOOGLE PAGE to ask a question about small business programming, now he is on the opening page with the many little images i see on lobby computers when idol. The second witness is a 50 year software and firmware specialist with many years of programming. WE BOTH WITNESSED THE WORD GOOGLE. If nothing in processing room connects to the outside, how did this happen? ARE ANY MACHINES ABLE TO CONNECT TO AN OUTSIDE INTERNET CONNECTION TO BE ABLE TO GET TO A GOGGLE SEARCH BAR?	As previously explained, the voter registration system and the election management system are two completely separate and unique systems utilized within the Central Counting Place. The election management system does not have any connection to the internet - while the voter registration system does have connection in order to access the Statewide VREMS system.
Roblyn W. 6/2/2026	On 6/1/2026 I wrote a written complaint about witnessing a badge situation that was not what George told me was procedure, after complaining there were never republican representation. The next day 4 appeared. One was wearing a Rep badge given to George and he put in on leading us to believe she was given Georgeʼs (who had come in the room without his - the first time we have seen that) Badge to wear, to look like the room republicans - suddenly - after 2 weeks of observing, or at least it seemed that to us. Now, today, seems my complaint has caused a change in procedure. Now a bunch of badge colors are being kept inside the processing room, not assigned w/ names identifying a vetted county workers political party. Is this the new procedure to "help" the observers know that the requirements of bipartisan teams are being respected where people decide the intentions of the original voter, and make a new ballot for them, properly reproducing those ballots? What is the new procedure?	The Registrar of Voters Office verifies employee voter registration records before assigning badges color-coded to their party, and there is no misrepresentation of an employee’s party affiliation. Badges are not shared between employees, and these badges all have names. The Public Information Officer's badge is uniquely identifiable by the 8 gold stars, indicating he is the assigned staff to answer observation questions. Some badges are stored within the Central Counting Place as they come coupled with their hardware security key used to access the voter registration system.
Roblyn W. 6/2/2026	What is Serena doing on the computer in front of the desk? This is an area there is no meaningful observation. The screen shows voter information on screens at the signature verification center where manual verication is necessary, and, because information on voters can be changed by county workers, always needs a bipartisan team. My understanding is that the only task a solo worker is allowd to do is to enter undeliverable mail into the voters record. This was not the case. She was not looking at envelopes, just the page onlne, going to drop downs, and changing data on voters pages, then going to the next. Can you provide meaningful observation to this area. There are two questions here.	Serena is a permanent ROV employee assigned to work in the Central Counting Place. Serena works at this workstation to ensure permanent staff is always available to supervise and assist Central Counting Place operations. During times when she is not conducting mail ballot processing operations, she is completing other assigned duties such as voter registration processing.
Brianna F. 6/2/2026	Thank you for your reply. I do want to state, once again, that on May 23, 2026 around 9am, a security guard noticed that, in the central counting place, on the mail in ballot processing floor, the back door to the garage, where ballot deliveries are made, was left ajar. I observed the security guard open and close the door. I then asked Rohit, around 9:13am, in the office, if it had been left ajar. Rohit went back to the processing floor and asked the guard and then verified with me that it had in fact been left ajar and unsecured and that the security guard closed it. You can access your county security camera footage to verify this. I understand that accidents happen and that is why I asked that members of the public have access to a livestream view of that back door. We have been able to view these doors on livestream feeds of election footage in the past. You stated in your published answer on the county web page that the door I mentioned was not within the central counting place and that is not accurate. Could you please revisit that question and reflect on this statement? There was in fact an unsecured door on the mail in ballot processing floor. I have attached a photo of the back door, left ajar. I also wrote in that same group of published questions: “5. The staff member who performed daily maintenance this morning wears a small black rectangular device on his hip. What is this?” And you replied. “The device mentioned on an employee's hip is a phone.” I have attached a photo, it is not a phone, but a smaller device. Could you also please revisit that question? I have attached a photo of the device. I tried to bring the important observation about the back door to Mr. McDonald’s attention immediately on May 23, 2026 in a handwritten letter, however the answers were just addressed to me today, June 2, 2026, after I was required to submit them on an observation form.	Thank you for the clarification of which door you were speaking of, as there are multiple doors to the garage in Building A. The event you’re referring to was on the morning of Saturday, May 23rd. As mail ballots were delivered from the USPS, a door to the garage was not fully shut behind an employee as the final delivery was made. This occurred at 8:08am, and the door was left partially closed until it was fully closed at 9:07am. Staff were present in the room for the entire duration of the hour it was improperly closed, and a security guard post is set right next to this very door. As soon as staff were notified of the door not being properly closed, the team reviewed and confirmed no entry or exit of staff or any materials occurred. As for the matter of the rectangular device, the specific staff member you were referencing to is known to wear their phone on their hip. After inspecting the photo you provided, the “device” you are referring to is a lanyard connected to the employee’s phone within his pocket. Observers with questions are required to submit the prescribed question form. Intentional circumvention of this process via handwritten letters or other submission methods are not accepted.
Glenn O. 6/3/2026	On 06/02/2026 at 1910 pdt, a team entered the ballot processing room from the west end and delivered ballots in blue bags that were inside green bags. Per NRS 293.462 The container must be metal or rigid container. Each container must have a separately- numbered seal. As it against the law to not use rigid or metal containers for this purpose. As it against the law to not provide a way to make the numbered seals observable?	The Registrar's Office allows the observation of the delivery of our sealed containers used for transporting ballots to the Central Counting Place. These containers are constructed from a multi-layer composite material consisting of vinyl-coated nylon and polyester fabric bonded with a moisture-resistant inner liner. The material is exceptionally strong and wear-resistant, maintaining its structural integrity during transport and handling while providing secure protection for ballots. Numbered seals are tracked in chain-of-custody documentation to ensure the containers have not been opened during transit from the collection location to the Central Counting Place. It is worth noting that the Registrar's Office is currently evaluating new ballot transport container options, and the containers used in future elections may change as alternatives are assessed for operational efficiency and security.
Barbara F. 6/4/2026	1) Are the "manual signature verifications" work stations used for other reasons besides sig verifs? I have seen 1 person at each station during observations, several times. 2) Where in the NRS specifically is the ballot process you are following? 3) Are the ballots being run thru the sorter fr this morningsʼ USPS delivery + last nightʼs polling places deliveries after closing?	Manual signature verification workstations can be and are used for other purposes like checking in undeliverable mail ballots, which only requires 1 person. NAC 293.322 is a fantastic example of ballot processing law within Title 24. Ballots being run through the sorter in the morning are those that are received from the USPS, while the night's polling place deliveries are run that same night.
Valerie W. 6/6/2026	1) Describe the flow of the voter registration file in our system. 2) What is the connection between the overseer station and the EMS? Are they physically connected or with wifi? 3) What is the role of the overseer with the voter registration file? 4) Why does the overseer need to update the voter registration file? 5) Why does the EMS have to maintain the latest version of the registration file? 6) Why does the EMS workstation system need to have the updated version of the registration file? 7) Where do the “new numbers” of registrations come from? 8) What do you mean by “numbers”? 9) Why does the overseer need to update the voter registration file? 10) Why does the EMS have to maintain the latest version of the registration file? 11) Why does the EMS workstation system need to have the updated version of the registration file 12) Where do the “new numbers” of registrations come from? 13) What do you mean by “numbers”?	At the conclusion of Early Voting, the voter registration count is updated within the Election Management System (EMS) in preparation for Election Day. This update ensures that the EMS accurately reflects the number of registered voters in each precinct and district throughout Washoe County. The count of registered voters is sourced directly from the Statewide Voter Registration System (VREMS), which is accessible from the “overseer station”. Because the EMS is an offline system that is not connected to any network, wireless technology, or Bluetooth, and does not contain functionality to modify the registration count file internally, the file must be exported from the EMS and transferred via an external USB storage device to the “overseer station” for editing. The overseer station is not connected to the EMS and cannot directly access EMS data. Once the update is completed, the file is transferred back to and imported into the EMS using the same external USB storage device.
Valerie W. 6/6/2026	How many EASE/UOCAVA ballots have been received as of 6.5.26? How many EASE/UOCAVA ballots have been duplicated as of 6.5.26? How many EASE/UOCAVA ballots have been scanned as of 6.5.26? Please provide the number of EASE/UOCAVA ballots received on: May 23, May 24, May 25, May 26, May 27, May 28, May 29, May 30, May 31, June 1, June 2, June 3, June 4, June 5? How many EASE/UOCAVA ballots are waiting to be duplicated? How many EASE/UOCAVA ballots are waiting to be scanned?	All mail ballot data is available daily within on the Registrar of Voter's website, under the 2026 Election Data page. Once an EASE ballot is verified and accepted, the ballot must be duplicated to be processed, and then the duplicated ballot is scanned.
Oscar Williams 6/7/2026	1) How many people have been assigned a "hardware security key" used to access the voter registration system? 2) What other systems do these people have admin access to? 3) Do they have full admin authorization when in the system?	We are unable to provide information related to the security of an election information system as such information is confidential pursuant to NRS 293.870. However, I can clarify that the hardware security keys are a two-factor authentication method used to access the system and do not grant administrative access.
Roblyn W. 6/7/2026	Serena was again doing a task at the end of the off camera area of the table, handling ballot envelopes of some sort. Was this a task that can be done by one person, or is there need for two? We do not have meaningful observation into the batching area when off camera so we do not know.
Patrick M. 6/7/2026	I know there are supposed to be 2 people who verify signatures at the signature verification computers. Sometimes though, I`ve seen just 1 worker using those computers alone. If other things than signature verification can be done at those computers, what are all those other things? When is it allowed for one person to do any kind of work at any of those verification stations? Is it the same program used as when someone is doing signature? Why do the people doing work at the signature verification stations sometimes have ballots they`re looking at in their hands and sometimes not? I`ve seen Addie and one other person sometimes sit at the closest signature verification computer sign in on the clipboard, then sign out almost immediately and walk away. What is she doing?
Allison H. 6/7/2026	This is my first time observing in person. I ʼve viewed from the YouTube prior. Iʼm very surprised by how much larger the room is in person. Why isnʼt there a camera showing the duplication station, or even anything that shows monitor screens? Iʼm also surprised the live TV feed isnʼt actually live, rather 30 seconds (about) behind. How is this not a live feed? The city is investing in cameras to monitor the public... why not better cams for transparency?	Washoe County's Central Counting Place accommodates ballot processing operations, staff workstations, observers, and a courtesy livestream all within a limited space that has been operationally outgrown. Workstation layouts and camera placement are intentionally designed to maximize meaningful observation while balancing operational efficiency. Throughout the 2024 election cycle, our office devoted significant effort to evaluating observability, reviewing camera angles and locations, adjusting workstation placements where feasible, and gathering feedback from stakeholders. The current layout reflects the outcome of that review process. The TV by the observation booth is displaying the available YouTube livestream. It is not set up as a live CCTV feed, which is why there is a delay.